Thursday, September 18, 2008

Correa's Communication Strategy

President Rafael Correa has many good qualities and many bad qualities. In an attempt to achieve some semblance of balance, allow me to expand on some of his more respectable characteristics.

First, Correa is a man who has the country's bests interests in his heart. I don't mean to say that every decision he makes is in Ecuador's best interest. Nevertheless, he does act out of a desire to see a better country for tomorrow, and not out of simple narrow self-interest, as was the case with Gutierrez and Bucaram (Mahuad was a different story altogether).

Furthermore, Rafael Correa has taken great strides to shun the kind of Presidential lifestyle that often leads to corruption and a strong sense of entitlement. Of course he does take the trolley lanes when he needs to get somewhere, and it goes without saying that he travels under heavy security. Still, by not living in the Presidential palace, by donating gifts given by foreign heads of state, by refusing to allow others to name things in his honour, by his wife's refusal to accept the post of "first lady," Correa has demonstrated that he will not allow power to corrupt him (in a material sense).

I'll give you an example. The father of a friend of mine works in the Cancilleria (Foreign Ministry). The man, who is an ardent anti-Correista, received a phone call one day from President Correa's brother Fabricio. Fabricio had called in order to see if it was possible to expedite the nationalization process of Marcelo Elizaga, the Argentine goalkeeper who plays for President Correa's favourite team, EMELEC. The principled civil servant responded that, no, he couldn't accelerate the process, but he would take due diligence to make sure the file received the correct attention. Fabricio was not pleased with the answer. A few days later my friend's father received a phone call from the President. He was not used to having the head of state call him about such issues and he immediately become nervous. "Is this Mr. X?," asked President Correa. "Yes," he responded. "Well Mr. X, I want to tell you something: The only Correa you respond to around here is Rafael, and not Fabricio, do you hear me?". I heard this story as an anecdote and then later saw similar things happen in public: Correa's brother and his sister have attempted to highjack his name in order to gain influence. President Correa has not had a problem repudiating even his own family members in public for what he sees as unlawful behaviour.

Where President Correa should improve is his communication strategy. Correa's handling of his domestic opponents is what leads comparisons to Hugo Chavez in Venezuela and Evo Morales in Bolivia. Indeed, although there are significant differences between these heads of state (that'll be the topic of another post), all three have the tendency to attack the character and integrity of their opponents, painting the world in black and white. One difference is that whereas Chavez and Morales don't mind applying this same strategy to foreign policy, Correa has been much more careful to act as a statesman on the international scene (the Colombia spat, of course, being the one exception).

Correa's communication strategy is motivated by two different factors.

i.) Correa feels that he must speak the whole truth all of the time and never colour what he thinks. This leads to problems as much of what he is says is interpreted literally or easily manipulated (ie. The fact that he said the Malecon 2000 was "ugly" and "Miami-esque" led to charges he he was "anti-Guayaquil"). I believe his thought pattern is that so long as I speak the truth I'll never have anything to regret if they throw me out of office. The problem is that as a result of his communication strategy he often feeds the perception that he is a left-wing extremist bent on transforming Ecuador into another coming of Cuba. The truth couldn't be more different but that is not the point. Correa understands that the opposition is constantly trying to paint him red yet he continually refuses to do anything to correct that image. Analysts who follow the government are left to measure the difference between his discourse and his actions to determine how he is really going to act in any given situation (look, for example, at the history of his statements regarding foreign debt and Ecuador's record on the same topic during his time in office.)

ii.) Correa acts like the last soldier left alive in a bunker facing a charging army. He sees anyone who criticizes him as a necessary evil that must be defeated. He rarely extends an olive branch to anyone who has gone so far as to publicly criticize him or his government. Although he has taken strides to keep demoted ministers within the government, if they choose to leave by their own accord they can expect to experience his wrath once out of office, regardless of how much time, dedication, and loyalty they've previously given to him.

Correa could justify this attitude by stating that it is obvious who wants to stop his citizens' revolution and with the nation's media and financial sectors opposed to any type of change he must be on guard against those who approach in good faith but have ulterior motives. He'd point the example of Alberto Acosta: Acosta reached out to opposition members in the Constituent Assembly and gave them an opportunity to have the floor at a much higher proportion than what their numbers merited. Then, when it become clear that the assembly wouldn't finish its work on time without speeding up the process, the opposition cried foul and stated that the process was no longer democratic. If the assembly had extended its work period, Correa would argue, those same opposition members would cry that the Correa government hadn't kept its promise and the whole process was a fiasco.

A healthy doubt of suspicion in one of the most corrupt countries in the world is always heathy. Nevertheless, bunkering down in a "me against the world" attitude alienates a lot of potential supporters and turns off many who support the process but not every decision made by the Correa/PAIS government.

The best sign of this includes the, in my mind, quality assembly members who have essentially left the PAIS fold. People like Fernando Vega, Monica Chuji, etc., are individuals who made PAIS an open tent diverse group (the anti-abortion model Rosana Quierolo was a one trick poney who no-one will miss. Her inclusion on the ticket was a recolection of the traditional way of "doing" Ecuadorian politics and should never have happened to begin with). Their absense will add to the argument that PAIS has become a group of "alzamanos" (Hand raisers) who simply permit Correa to govern without effective checks and balances.

Although I was encouraged after the first referendum when Correa used his victory speech to call for reconciliation, I think what needs to happen is for him to take the first steps in that direction. Without wanting to be completely pessimistic, a victory or a loss in the upcoming election would provide the perfect opportunity for that type of reconciliation to take place. First comes first though, Correa needs to modify his communications strategy. If not the rest of his mandate (which could be 6 months, 4 years, or 8 years), will see a continuation of the divisive cut-throat politics that have characterized his administration. It's not healthy for him, it's not healthy for the country, and its definitely not healthy for the future.

No comments: